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I investigate the effects of the issuance of the PCAOB Part II report on audit fees and 
audit quality. The PCAOB replaced the peer review auditor program with an independent 
inspection of audit firms. Upon completion of each inspection, the PCAOB issues inspection 
reports that include a public portion (Part I) of identified audit deficiencies, and most include a 
nonpublic portion (Part II) of identified quality control weaknesses which is not disclosed 
publicly unless the audit firm does not sufficiently complete remediation during the next 12 
months. Upon issuance of the Part II report, I find that audit firms experience reputational 
damage resulting in a decrease in audit fees. I also find that though audit fees decrease, audit 
quality increases as the audit firms increase their efforts to remediate the quality control issues 
identified in the Part II report in an effort to comply with the expectations of the PCAOB. In 
summary, my results indicate that there is an associated cost to audit firms when they are unable 
to remediate their control deficiencies within the 12 month remediation period as well as an 
associated benefit for the audit clients who decide to remain with the audit firm after the issuance 
of the Part II report, as they not only are able to negotiate lower audit fees but also receive higher 





The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of the release of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Part II reports on audit fees and audit quality. More 
specifically, does the release of the PCAOB Part II report damage the reputation of the audit firm 
and ultimately decrease audit fees for the firm’s clients? Additionally, does the reputational 
damage result in increased effort by the audit firms in an attempt to repair their relationship with 
their clients and ultimately increasing audit quality at the expense of a reduced margin? My 
findings suggest that the audit firm does experience reputational damage resulting in their 
inability to charge fee increases and a negative change in audit fees for the two year period 
following the Part II issuance.  In addition, the clients experience an increase in audit quality as 
proxied by abnormal accruals. 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) established the PCAOB (Board) with a charge to, ‘‘. . 
.protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, 
accurate, and independent audit reports.’’ The act provides the Board with responsibilities related 
to registration, standard setting, and enforcement but it is the inspections that the Board feels are 
the primary vehicle for improving the quality of auditing practice (Gillan, 2005; Goelzer, 2006; 
McDonough, 2005). The PCAOB replaced the peer review auditor program with an independent 
inspection of audit firms. Upon completion of each inspection, the PCAOB issues inspection 
reports that include a public portion (Part I) of identified audit deficiencies, and most include a 
nonpublic portion (Part II) of identified quality control weaknesses which is not disclosed 
publicly unless the audit firm does not sufficiently complete remediation of the quality control 
weaknesses during the 12 months following the issuance of Part I.  
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The PCAOB’s evaluation of a firm’s system of quality control covers a broad range of 
controls that facilitates audit firms ability to provide a quality audit. This would include a review 
of policies, procedures, and practices concerning audit performance, training, compliance with 
independence requirements, client acceptance and retention, and the establishment of policies 
and procedures (PCAOB 2012). Additional areas covered are the corporate governance controls 
that include the firm’s ‘tone at the top’ as it relates to audit quality, partner management, and the 
firm’s self-monitoring of its practice (PCAOB 2012). When a significant quality control problem 
is identified, the inspectors address the issues with the firm and; the final inspection report 
provided to the auditor includes a description of the problem (PCAOB 2006), although the 
information is redacted from the report prior to its issuance to the public. Section 104(g)(2) of 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act provides the firm 12 months to satisfactory address the identified control 
issues. Effective remediation of control deficiencies in Part II reports allows audit firms to 
prevent the public disclosure of Part II information. However, if the firm fails to address the 
quality control deficiencies to the Board’s satisfaction, the Part II report is released to the public 
(PCAOB 2006). 
Recent research has questioned the transparency and informativeness of the PCAOBs 
reporting model (Hodowanitz and Solieri 2005; Coates 2007; Johnson 2007; Lennox and Pittman 
2010). Lennox and Pittman’s (2010) findings suggest that the PCAOB’s reporting model allows 
for information to be hidden from audit clients and thus the public reports are not viewed as 
informative about audit firm quality. This finding is supported by J. Michael Cook, the former 
CEO of Deloitte who stated (Johnson 2007) “I think the [PCAOB inspection] process is well 
intentioned, and it is helpful and constructive, but right now it is not producing the kind of results 
3 
 
that it should for people who are using the results and trying to understand what this means.” 
Similarly, Hodowanitz and Solieri (2005) criticize the lack of transparency in PCAOB reports,  
“With today's emphasis on full disclosure by public companies, a confidentiality 
escape clause does little to inspire investor confidence in the PCAOB as the 
auditing profession's newly appointed watchdog. Unless there is full disclosure 
and transparency in the inspection process, Congress, the SEC, and the PCAOB 
will have a hard time explaining future audit failures to the investing public.”  
 
As time has passed, PCAOB inspections have allowed for increasing transparency of 
audit quality for those audit firms who have experienced the public issuance of their Part II 
reports. The disclosures of unresolved quality control issues are one source for gaining some 
insight into problems that undermine effective quality controls, and possibly the quality of audits 
performed. As these are firm wide and pervasive control issues, they would affect every client 
the firm serves. The public disclosure of the audit firm’s poor quality to its clients, potential 
clients and investors provides additional information that can be used to exert fee pressure on the 
firm. However, the firm still has a duty and responsibility to its clients to do everything in its 
power to resolve the identified quality issues. In completing that task the firm may determine that 
it is in its best interest to acquiesce to the fee pressure while ultimately exerting more effort.  In 
this way the firm is willing to take a hit on its margin in order to keep its clients. Using a large 
sample of firm clients, I find that clients who remain with the audit firm for a two year period 
after the release of the Part II report experience greater audit quality at reduced audit fees than 
prior to the release of the Part II report.  
Past research has found what appears to be a link between the number of weaknesses 
identified in the peer report and firm-quality attributes (Casterella et al. 2009). Additionally, 
there is a link between seriously deficient weaknesses or internal control deficient weaknesses 
identified in the PCAOB Part I report and firm-quality attributes for the inspected auditors 
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(Gunny et al. 2013; DeFond and Lennox 2015). Each of these papers point out the usefulness of 
audit review reports to identify firms with poor audit quality. However, they do not consider how 
the Part II quality control weaknesses (how the firms internal quality control, training programs 
and audit methodology) plays into the auditor’s failure to identify these serious deficient 
weaknesses. Part II reports describe the quality control issues that are broad and pervasive and 
affect every audit conducted by the auditor, essentially affecting every client of the auditor. With 
the Part II issuance, clients are able to understand their auditors’ ability to perform a quality audit 
and make decisions as to whether to switch auditors. If they decide to remain with the audit firm, 
they are also able to increase their bargaining power and demand lower audit fees. Using three 
different measures of audit fees, natural log of audit fees (LNAF), fee increases, and changes in 
audit fees, I find that these clients have lower audit fees in the two year post remediation period 
as compared to the three year period prior to the issuance of the Part II report.  
Recent research has started addressing whether the release of the Part II report damages 
the auditor’s reputation. Nagy (2014) finds that audit firms lose a significant amount of market 
share following the public disclosure of quality control criticisms indicating that the disclosure 
damages the auditors’ reputation. Buslepp and Victoravich (2014) find that clients of triennial 
firms are more likely to change auditors after the release of the Part II. Additionally, they find 
that audit quality is lower in terms of restatements for those triennial companies during the 
remediation period. However, they do not consider the post remediation period. This study 
considers the reputational damage to the audit firms by looking at the effect of the Part II report 
on audit fees for those clients who remain with the firm after the issuance of the report. I find 
that audit firms are unable to increase their audit fees and their change in audit fees is 
significantly negative in the two year period following the issuance of their Part II report. Using 
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abnormal accruals as a proxy for audit quality, I also find that audit quality increases in this two 
year period for those clients who remain with the firm. 
Drake et al. (2014) investigate whether audit firms respond to the particular account 
related deficiencies identified in PCAOB Part II reports. They examineclient changes in 
reporting of the deficient account by considering the changes brought about by the public release 
of Deloitte’s 2009 Part II report. They find that Deloitte’s clients increased the reserve for 
uncertain tax benefits (UTBs) in response to increased auditor scrutiny over the tax accounts and 
suggest that the change in auditor scrutiny also influences the financial reporting of the inspected 
audit firm’s clients. Though these papers address audit quality during the period of remediation 
and how the public issuance of the report is associated with decisions to make a change in 
auditor or a change in financial reporting, they do not address whether the PCAOBs issuance of 
the report fulfills their objective and obligation to the investors of ultimately increasing audit 
quality during the 12 months following the issuance of the Part II report (post remediation 
period). Additionally, they do not address the effect of the reputational damage on the audit firms 
audit fees. 
Using recent audit fee research methodology (Francis et al. 2005; Hay et al 2006; 
Reichelt and Wang 2010), I develop three measures of audit fees, natural log of audit fees 
(LNAF), fee increases and changes in audit fees from one period to the next.  To determine the 
effect of the Part II reports on audit fees, I regress the audit fee measure on the Post Remediation 
(Post_Rem) period which is a two year period after the public issuance of the Part II report.  I 
find that overall audit firms are unable to raise their audit fees after the issuance of the Part II 
report.  Specifically, audit firms are unable to increase audit fees and audit fee changes are 
significantly negative after the issuance. 
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Using abnormal accruals as a proxy for audit quality (Dechow anc Dichev 2002; Kothari 
2005) I determine the effect of the Part II reports on audit quality.  I find that the overall audit 
firms limit their clients’ ability to manage earnings through the use of abnormal accruals after the 
public issuance of their Part II reports.  
In summary, a public Part II report does damage the reputation of the audit firm resulting 
in lower audit fees. However, the audit firms efforts to clear the quality control deficiencies and 
meet the expectations of the PCAOB ultimately increases the audit quality for those clients who 
decide to remain with their audit firm after the public issuance of their Part II report. 
As researchers it is important that our research provides information that is useful to 
investors, regulators and the public as a whole. As there is still some question on whether the 
additional cost of Sarbanes-Oxley was worth the benefits, one of which is whether the cost of the 
PCAOB inspection process is providing the expected benefits?  My study contributes to the 
literature as follows: First, I provide evidence that there is a cost to the audit firm associated with 
the release of their Part II report. That is, clients who decide to remain with their auditor who had 
a Part II report released are able to demand lower audit fees in the two year period after the 
release. Second, I find that while audit fees decreased, audit quality (based on abnormal accruals) 
increased for these clients. The third contribution is that my study provides direct evidence to 
auditors, regulators and the users of the financial reports that the PCAOB inspection process is 
meeting its main objective of increasing audit quality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a review of 
related studies and develops the hypotheses of this study. Section three describes the sample 
selection, the methodology, and presents the results of descriptive statistics and univariate 
analysis. Section four describes the research design and presents the results of the multivariate 
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analysis of audit fees and audit quality and section five provides the additional tests in support of 





2. RELATED STUDIES AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Reputational Damage and Audit Fees 
The objective of the PCAOB’s inspections is to provide protection to investors by 
scrutinizing audit work, providing public information about identified audit weaknesses, and 
creating incentives for auditors to be more diligent and watchful (e.g., DeFond 2010). Therefore, 
one would expect that after notification of the intent to publicly disclose the Part II report that the 
audit firm reaction would be to take every and all actions necessary to correct the deficiencies to 
avoid public release of the Part II report related to the same issues in the following year. 
However, my review of the firms with Part II reports indicates that some firms experience 
multiple subsequent Part II releases.  To date all of the Big 4 and Grant Thornton have  received 
multiple subsequent Part II public releases. Dowling et al. (2015) would say this is due to the 
slippery slope of enforcing regulations. That is, as the oversight regulator strengthens their 
enforcement strategy, an antagonistic (rather than synergistic) compliance climate emerges 
where the regulator and the regulated hold divergent views of the optimal methods for achieving 
compliance (Dowling et al. 2015). This view can be seen in Deloitte’s response to its inspection 
report in 2009 (PCAOB 2009a). 
My experience in an audit firm who had a Part II release and Deloitte’s response in its 
Advancing Quality through Transparency Report (Deloitte & Touche 2010) substantiates this 
notion. Deloitte’s report discusses their intentions to implement further process improvements in 
response to PCAOB inspections along with strengthening its own internal inspection processes 
by implementing a new audit methodology, developing new training, and enhancing engagement 
review and feedback procedures. Additionally, Ernst & Young has issued a public response to 
their 2010 PCAOB Part II inspection report stating: 
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We have provided our audit professionals with new audit tools, additional 
training, and expanded technical guidance. These efforts have been beneficial 
generally and continue to improve our execution. Overall, we have invested 
thousands of partner and staff hours on these issues and believe we approached 
each board criticism seriously and responsibly (PCAOB 2010a, p. 3). 
 
As the public responses indicate, the audit firms take these firm-wide audit quality control 
deficiencies very seriously and the audit firms’ response would be significantly different in 
contrast to the issuance of the Part I reports. With that said, audit firms may need to exert more 
effort on their audits to address the PCAOB’s concerns and complete their remediation efforts 
which would result in increased audit fees if they are able to convince their audit clients that the 
additional effort is in the clients’ best interests. 
Recent research has indicated that the PCAOB has met their objective of increasing audit 
quality as some smaller accounting firms (local and regional) stopped auditing public companies 
due to concerns over the inspection process (Read et al. 2004). Carcello et al. (2011) find that the 
inception of the PCAOB inspection process as a whole yields an increase in audit quality 
(proxied by a decrease in the absolute value of discretionary accruals). However, Gunny and 
Zhang (2013) find that engagement-level audit deficiencies identified in PCAOB Part I 
inspection reports do not distinguish audit quality. An inherent limitation to the Part I report is its 
lack of information about the client or offices reviewed so in some settings, high-deficiency audit 
firms are associated with higher audit quality. Though past research has mixed results, the 
PCAOB’s inspection process, by its very nature, promotes learning. Inspectors discuss issues 
with accounting firm representatives and provide formal feedback on audit deficiencies and on 
the firms’ quality controls (PCAOB 2009a and b; 2010 a - c).  
Other research on the informativeness and usefulness of the PCAOB audit reports calls 
into question whether the PCAOB has fully met its objective. Lennox and Pittman (2010) find 
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that weaknesses identified in the Part I reports, the public portion of the report, are not perceived 
by clients as informative as it fails to predict subsequent changes in the audit firms’ market 
share. They imply that the information contained in the non-public portion of the (Part II) report 
may be deemed more important than what is reported in the Part I report. However, others find 
an association between the type of deficiencies and auditor dismissal (Abbott et al. 2013; 
Daugherty and Tervo 2010). Additionally, others have identified a significant market response to 
the issuance of the Part I reports (Robertson and Houston 2010; Offermanns and Peek 2011). 
Those that have found a market reaction to the issuance of the PCAOB Part I reports point out 
that public criticism of the audit firms has resulted in damage to the firm’s reputation resulting in 
a market reaction to the clients’ stock price.   
With the maturing of the inspection process, more Part II reports have become public and 
recent research finds a negative client reaction associated with the public criticism of the 
auditor’s quality control system. Nagy (2014) finds that audit firms lose a significant amount of 
market share following the public disclosure of quality control criticisms indicating that the 
disclosure is damaging to the auditors reputation. Buslepp and Victoravich (2014) find that 
clients of triennial firms are more likely to change auditors after the release of the Part II report. 
Though these papers have considered some aspects of the effect of the damage brought about by 
clients leaving the firm or the firm’s ability to replace those clients, they have not considered the 
affect for those clients who decide to remain with the firm.   
Several past papers have noted that managers will pay audit fee premiums to receive 
higher audit quality not only to reduce agency costs but also for brand name recognition or 
specialization (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Francis 1984; Francis et al. 2005). Additionally, 
Boone et al. (2014) find that the PCAOB’s censure (i.e., 2007 disciplinary order) was associated 
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with a decrease in Deloitte’s ability to retain and attract new clients, and a decrease in Deloitte’s 
audit fee growth rates. Additionally, Weber et al. (2008) find that KPMG had an increase in the 
number of clients who switched audit firms in the year of the ComROAD scandal. Both studies 
indicate that once the reputation of the auditor is tarnished, the client’s willingness to pay audit 
fee premiums is lessened. However, with the increased scrutiny of the PCAOB, the audit firm 
would be inclined to increase its efforts to complete their remediation plan that they were unable 
to complete during the 12 month remediation period. This increased effort could be either at the 
corporate level or the client level which would ultimately result in increased audit fees. DeFond 
and Lennox (2015) find that higher rates of internal control deficiencies in the Part I report 
prompt auditors to perform more rigorous tests and evaluation of their clients resulting in higher 
audit fees. As such, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Audit fees are different for audit firm clients who remain with the audit 
firm after the firm has experienced the release of the PCAOB Part II report. 
2.2 Reputational Damage and Audit Quality 
The PCAOB’s main objective is to increase audit quality through their inspection 
process. Through a risk based approach the PCAOB select audit engagements to review the audit 
firm’s audit results along with performing other procedures to assess the audit firm’s control 
environment (e.g., assessment of managements “tone at the top”, training and internal quality 
control processes and policies and procedures to name a few). It is the control environment, as 
with a company, that determines the firm’s ability to produce quality work (i.e., quality audits). 
Some would say that the PCAOB has not yet met its objective and point directly to the non-
public portion of the PCAOBs reporting process as the issue (Hodowanitz and Solieri 2005; 
Lennox and Pittman 2010). Others have found limited evidence of improvement in audit quality 
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through the use of the Part I report information (Carcello et al. 2011; Defond and Lennox 2011; 
Gramling et al. 2011; Church and Shefchik 2012; Gunny and Zhang 2013; Defond and Lennox 
2015). These studies have predominantly found results indicating that audit quality has improved 
for the triennially inspected firms but have found mixed results for the annually inspected firms.   
Carcello et al. (2011) find a decrease in earnings management in the year following the 
first two PCAOB inspections. Though they point out that the decrease is attributable to the audit 
firms’ changes to their training, audit approach, and documentation to address deficiencies noted 
in PCAOB inspection reports they fail to consider that the changes may be driven by unrelated 
quality control issues identified in the non-published Part II report. Additionally, through a risk 
based approach the PCAOB selects audit firm clients for review which with the client base of 
annually inspected auditors being large and diverse, may not be representative of the auditor’s 
overall client base.  
On the other hand, Gunny and Zhang (2013) find among the annually inspected auditors, 
the results are conflicting and suggest PCAOB inspection reports do not distinguish audit quality 
during the period inspected. Though these papers have addressed some aspects of audit quality 
they have not considered the effect of the public issuance of the Part II report which directly 
addresses a firm’s quality control issues that would have an overall effect on all of the firm’s 
clients (i.e., Deloitte’s recent change in audit methodology after the release of its 2009 Part II 
report). 
Finally, there are some papers that specifically consider the effects of the issuance of the 
Part II reports. Nagy (2014) finds that audit firms lose market share after the public issuance of 
the Part II report indicating that the reports are a credible signal of audit quality to the audit 
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clients. Drake et al. (2014), using the issuance of Deloitte’s 2007 Part II report, find that the 
content of the report affects auditor scrutiny, and the change in auditor scrutiny also influences 
the financial reporting quality of the inspected audit firm’s clients. Buslepp and Victoravich 
(2014) find that triennially audited firms who have not remediated their quality control issues 
had lower audit quality in terms of restatements in the remediation period, that is the 12 month 
period between the issuance of the Part I and the issuance of the Part II reports, than those firms 
who had successfully remediated their quality control issues. However, they do not consider the 
audit quality for the period after the issuance of the Part II report (post remediation period).   
Although, these papers are making strides to consider how the public release of the Part II 
reports provide information about audit quality, they have not specifically considered the 
reaction of audit firms to the public criticism. Audit firms take the release of their Part II reports 
very seriously as demonstrated by Deloitte’s comments in its Advancing Quality through 
Transparency Report (Deloitte 2010) and E&Y’s public response to their 2010 PCAOB Part II 
inspection report (PCAOB 2010a, p. 3). Additionally, the PCAOB Chairman has indicated that 
by identifying and incentivizing accounting firms to correct their quality control defects, the 
quality control remediation process has the potential to lead firms to improve the quality of all 
their future audits (Doty 2011). Although the chairman was addressing the initial remediation 
period, it is logical to expect that audit firms would be even more incentivized to correct any and 
all issues prior to the next years report. As such, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Audit quality is different for audit firm clients who remain with the audit 




3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 Sample Selection 
I begin the sample selection process by collecting PCAOB reports for those firms with 
Part II releases and release dates of the reports prior to December 31, 2014. There are 160 reports 
issued for 121 audit firms (average of 1.33 reports per firm) during my sample period. Audit 
firms with Part II reports are made up of triennially and annually inspected audit firms (116 and 
5 respectively). The annually inspected population includes all of the Big4 audit firms along with 
Grant Thornton
1
. Each of these firms has had two subsequent years Part II reports issued. Figure 
1 below provides an overview of the release of annually inspected audit firms Part II report 
issuance during my sample period. 
From the Part II reports I identify the period of interest and match this information to 
Audit Analytics to obtain client, audit fees, going concern opinions and internal control opinions 
data. I delete foreign client firms, firms with zero or negative audit fees, and firms in the 
financial sector (SIC Codes 6000–6999).
2
 I then match to Compustat to obtain financial 
information for each client. To facilitate my ‘block’ design, I restrict the sample to the same 
client firms for all periods.
3
 From this sample, I derive several subsamples to analyze: audit fees 
(as proxied by the natural log of audit fees, fee increase and change in audit fees) and audit 
quality (as proxied by abnormal accrual). My main sample includes 4,263 observations 
(approximately 852 client years) which include 58 triennially inspected audit firm client 
observations and 4,205 annually inspected audit firm client observations. 
                                                          
1
 BDO, Crowe Horwath, and McGladrey are also inspected on an annual basis, but did not have a Part II report 
issued during the sample period. 
2
 Consistent with Francis et al. (2005), we exclude firms in the financial sector due to their dissimilarity and heavy 
industry regulation. 
3 
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FIGURE 1: Depiction of the Annually Inspected Part II Report Issuance 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for my sample selection. The sample is 
predominantly large clients who are audited by the Big 4 and Tier 2 audit firms (99%).  These 
clients have mean total assets of approximately $6.18 billion and mean audit fees of 
approximately $2.39 million. Additionally, 99% of them have FOREIGN operations, along with 
several business SEGMENTS. Finally, these clients are more complex as 15% have been 
through a MERGER and/or Acquisition, 19% have LEVEL 3 fair valued assets and/or liabilities, 





TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics (Audit Fees) 
Variable  N   Mean   Median   Std Dev   
AUDIT FEES ($000)         4,263      2,387.35    1,136.00      4,236.92   
ASSETS ($ millions)         4,263     6,175.54       829.27   17,826.70  
LNAF         4,263            7.06          7.04            1.18   
SIZE         4,263            6.76          6.71            2.16   
LIQUIDITY         4,263            2.64          1.78            3.01   
INVAR         4,263            0.20          0.15            0.16   
FOREIGN         4,263            0.99          1.00            0.10   
MERGER         4,263            0.15          0.00           0.36   
GC         4,263            0.03          0.00           0.18   
ICW         4,263            0.05          0.00           0.22   
LOSS         4,263            0.32          0.00              0.47   
YE         4,263            0.78          1.00            0.42   
TENURE         4,263            8.77          7.00            7.43   
ROA         4,263            0.08          0.06            0.09   
LITIGATION         4,263            0.22          0.00           0.42   
LEVERAGE         4,263            0.17          0.16            0.55   
SEGMENT         4,263            0.60          0.00             0.71   
LEVEL3         4,263            0.19          0.00             0.39   
INTANG         4,263            0.77          1.00            0.42   
CFO         4,263            0.06          0.08            0.29   
ABAF         4,063            0.06          0.07            0.56   
BIG4         4,263            0.86          1.00            0.35   
TIER 2         4,263            0.13          0.00             0.34   
FEE PREMIUM         4,263            0.52          1.00            0.50   
For the purposes of this table, I use a block sample method which requires firms to be consistent throughout the 




4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Client and Period Identification 
For each identified PCAOB Part II release, I identify all clients for those audit firms who 
were with the firm during the period one year prior to the initial audit review and remained with 
the audit firm subsequent to the release of the Part II report for a two year period. I select this 
post period to allow the client some time to react and renegotiate their audit fees with their 
auditor and also to allow the audit firm time to complete their remediation of quality issues. I 
construct a dummy variable POST_REM which I use to compare the period of the initial audit 
and the subsequent 12 months after the audit (coded 0) to the one year period after the release of 
the Part II audit report (coded 1) see Figure 2 below.  
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FIGURE 2: Illustration of Period Identification 
4.2 Audit Fees Methodology 
To consider the effect of the release of the Part II report on audit fees I estimate three 
models. Consistent with past research for audit fees, I use the dependent variable LNAF, 
measured as the natural log of a firm’s annual audit fees. To consider whether audit fees are 
affected by public issuance of the firms Part II report, I regress LNAF on POST_REM and a 
number of control variables derived from the audit fee literature (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; 




LNAF = INTERCEPT + α1SIZE+ α2LIQUIDITY + α3INVAR + α4FORIEGN + α5MERGERS + 
α6GC + α7ICW + α8LOSS + α9YE + α10TENURE + α11ROA + α12LITIGATION + 
α13LEVERAGE + α14SEGMENTS +  α15LEVEL3 +  + α16 INTANG + α17 ANNUAL + 
α18(POST_REM) + year and  industry fixed effects + ε         (1a) 
A significant negative/positive coefficient on POST_REM would support Hypothesis 1 
that audit fees significantly changed after the public issuance of the Part II report. A negative 
coefficient would indicate that the reputational damage brought about by the release of the audit 
firm’s Part II report has adversely affected the audit firm to charge audit fee premiums for those 
clients who decided to remain with the firm. However, a positive coefficient would indicate that 
the firms were able to pass along the cost of the extra effort made by the firm to resolve the 
quality control deficiencies noted in their Part II reports to their clients. 
Based on prior research additional variables are included within the model to control for 
client (size, risk and complexity) and auditor characteristics that would increase the effort of the 
auditor and are commonly used in the audit fee literature (Francis et al. 2005; Hay et al 2006; 
Reichelt and Wang 2010). To control for complexity which would increase auditor effort 
resulting in higher audit fees I include client SIZE (log_assets), MERGERS, FOREIGN 
operations, the number of business SEGMENTS (Log(SEG)), having Level 3 valued assets 
and/or liabilities (LEVEL3), and companies having intangibles (INTANG). To control for audit 
effort and risk, I also include the amount of inventory and receivables (INVAR), the issuance of a 
going concern opinion (GC), internal control weaknesses (ICW), return on assets (ROA), 
LEVERAGE, companies with high litigation risk (LITIGATION), and companies with losses 
(LOSS). Additionally, I control for audit fee premiums associated with annually inspected 
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auditors (ANNUAL), busy season demand for companies with December year-ends (YE), and the 
length of auditor tenure (TENURE)
4
. ε is a random disturbance term. 
As a secondary test, I separate the population based on whether an audit fee increase was 
paid in the post remediation period to determine if the POST_REM period was associated with 
an increase in audit fees or not. I estimate the following model with the dependent variable Fee 
Increase, an indicator variable equal to one if the change in audit fees from period t-1 to t is 
greater than zero, and zero otherwise, to determine the propensity to have a fee increase during 
the POST_REM period. 
Logit(FEE INCREASE= 1) = INTERCEPT + λ1SIZE + λ2LIQUIDITY + λ3INVAR  + λ4FOREIGN + 
λ5MERGERS+ λ6GC + λ7ICW + λ8LOSS + λ9YE + λ10TENURE + λ11ROA + 
λ12LITIGATION+ λ13LEVERAGE + λ 14SEGMENT + λ 15LEVEL3 + λ 16INTANG 
+ λ 17ABAF + λ 18ANNUAL +   λ19(POST_REM ) + year and industry fixed effects 
+ ε                   (1b) 
I also include the residual from the audit fee model (1a), abnormal audit fees (ABAF) as a control 
variable. A significant negative coefficient for POST_REM would support the notion that audit 
firms have suffered reputational damage brought about by the release of the audit firm’s Part II 
report.   
Additionally, to consider the economic consequences of an audit fee change after the 
issuance of the Part II report I calculate the change in audit fee (∆AF) equal to audit fees in the 
year following the issuance of the Part II report (aft) less the audit fees (aft-1) in the year prior to 
the issuance of the Part II report divided by audit fees (aft-1) in the year prior to the issuance of 
the Part II report and then estimate the following change model: 
                                                          
4
 See Appendix A for variable descriptions and calculations 
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∆AF = INTERCEPT+ θ 1∆SIZE+ θ 2∆LIQUIDITY + θ 3∆INVAR + θ4∆FORIEGN + θ 5∆MERGERS 
+ θ 6∆GC+ θ 7∆ICW + θ 8∆LOSS + + θ 19∆ROA + θ 10∆LEVERAGE + θ 11 ∆SEGMENTS + 
θ12∆LEVEL3 + θ 13∆INTANG + θ 14ANNUAL + θ 15(POST_REM) + year and industry 
fixed effects + ε              (1c) 
A significant negative coefficient for POST_REM would support the notion that the audit firms 
have suffered reputational damage brought about by the release of the audit firm’s Part II report.   
4.2.1 Empirical Results  
The results of estimating equations (1a), (1b) and (1c) are presented in Table 2. The t-
stats are computed based on the methodology in Rogers (1993) and clustered by firm. The 
dependent variable, for the three regressions, are the natural logarithm of audit fees, fee increase 
(where fee = 1 if there was an increase in audit fees in t+1, 0 otherwise) and change in audit fees 
respectively. The adjusted R
2’
s for LNAF 0.78 and Fee Increase 0.04 are consistent with prior 
studies (Francis and Simon 1987; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005, Ettredge et al. 2014). 
The coefficients on the control variables are consistent with prior studies (Francis and Simon 
1987; Ferguson et al. 2003; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Elder et al. 2009, Ettredge et al. 2014). 
 For the natural log of audit fees (LNAF) model, I find that audit fees in the post 
remediation period are negative but not significantly different from zero indicating that audit 
firms did not realize a cost associated with the issuance of their Part II report. However, I also 
consider the audit firms ability to increase fees in the remediation period.  For both the Fee  
Increase and Change in Audit Fees models, I find that the POST_REM period coefficient is 
negative and significantly different from zero (p-value < .05 and .01 respectively) suggesting that 
audit firms were unable to increase fees after the issuance of their Part II report and that the audit 
firms change in audit fees was significantly negative.  
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Overall, the results support H1 indicating that audit fees were significantly different 
during the first two years after the audit firm’s Part II report was issued. Additionally, the results 
support the intuition that the issuance of the Part II report does damage the reputation of the audit 
firm, resulting in a significant cost to these firms in addition to the direct costs of remediation. In 
the two year period following the issuance of the Part II reports the audit firms experiences a 
negative 43% change in audit fees along with a 19% decrease in the firm’s propensity to increase 
fees.   
TABLE 2: Multivariate Analysis: The Impact of the Issuance of the  









Fee Premium = 1 
Change in  
Audit Fees 
 Coeff   t-stat  Coeff Chi-Sq  Coeff   t-stat  
INTERCEPT      2.418       17.31  ***     (0.280)        0.16         1.152         1.78  * 
SIZE      0.488       81.56  ***      0.058         6.53  **      0.044         1.40    
LIQUIDITY     (0.012)       (3.56) ***      0.006         0.22         0.447       22.29  *** 
INVAR      0.566         7.74  ***      0.004         0.00        (0.001)       (4.07) *** 
FOREIGN      0.278         3.08  ***     (0.082)        0.06        (0.368)       (0.66)   
MERGERS      0.035         1.39         0.316       10.95  ***     (0.217)       (1.41)   
GC      0.286         5.37  ***     (0.174)        0.75        (1.190)       (3.20) *** 
ICW      0.328         8.34  ***      0.271         3.14  *     (0.439)       (2.17) ** 
LOSS      0.115         4.95  ***     (0.096)        1.16         0.220         1.77  * 
YE     (0.006)       (0.26)       (0.029)        0.12         7.540         8.48  *** 
TENURE      0.007         5.33  ***     (0.001)        0.01          
ROA     (0.045)       (0.42)        0.288         0.50         0.000         0.20    
LITIGATION      0.090         2.58  ***      0.038         0.08          
LEVERAGE     (0.014)       (0.86)       (0.022)        0.17         0.000         1.66  * 
SEGMENTS      0.096         6.94  ***      0.027         0.27        (0.396)       (1.27)   
LEVEL3       0.109         4.62  ***     (0.127)        2.00        (0.216)       (1.19)   
INTANG      0.170         6.81  ***     (0.235)        6.03  **      2.209         7.69  *** 
ABAF            0.156         6.51  **       
ANNUAL      0.670         8.42  ***     (0.453)        2.30         0.204         0.41    
POST_REM     (0.030)       (1.42)       (0.173)        4.72  **     (0.438)       (3.26) *** 
          N 
 
    4,263  
  
    4,063  
  
    3,738  






    21.13  
 % Concordiant 
    
63.0% 
     
The sample includes all clients of firms who have a public Part II report. The sample is a matched sample with the 
same firms throughout the sample period. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level, respectively, using a two-tailed test. The model includes industry (based on two-digit SIC code) and year fixed effects 
which are not presented for brevity. t-values and p-values are computed based on the methodology in Rogers (1993) and 




4.3 Discretionary Accruals Methodology 
One objective of the PCAOB inspections is improved audit quality which implies 
reduced earnings management. Although the relation between audit firm quality and 
management behavior is indirect, research provides some evidence of a relation between audit 
firm quality and management behavior (in the form of accruals) indicating that a higher quality 
audit firm is more likely to limit management’s accounting policy choices thereby reducing 
earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Francis et al. 1999). As such, an improvement in any firm’s quality 
controls should be reflected in lower abnormal accruals for the firm’s clients.  
Research has shown that abnormal accruals represent a deviation of actual accruals from 
expected accruals and, therefore, greater abnormal accruals indicate lower quality of financial 
reporting (Jones 1991; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005). 
Greater abnormal accruals also indicate that auditors do not constrain clients from managing 
earnings (Becker et al. 1998; Reynolds and Francis 2000; Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 
2003). To consider how the public issuance of the PCAOB Part II report effects the audit firms’ 
client’s level of discretionary accruals, I estimate equation (2) the absolute value (i.e., the 
magnitude) of abnormal accruals using two measures: following Kothari et al. (2005) 
performance adjusted methodology (|DACC|) and following Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) 
accruals quality measure (|DACCd|) to test the association between the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals and the period that follow the issuance of the Part II report: 
|DACC| or |DACCd| = INTERCEPT + Φ1SIZE + Φ2LOSS + Φ3ICW + Φ4LEVERAGE + 
Φ5LITIGATION + Φ6 FORIEGN + Φ7GC + Φ8TENURE + Φ9INVAR + Φ10MERGER + 
Φ11ROA + Φ12CFO + Φ13ANNUAL + Φ14 (POST_REM) + ε             (2) 
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As with Equation (1), I base my hypothesis on the parameter estimate for POST_REM. To 
test H2, I expect that the coefficients are significantly different from zero. A significant negative 
coefficient on POST_REM will indicate that the reputational damage brought about by the release 
of the audit firm’s Part II report has positively affected the audit quality for those clients who 
decided to remain with the audit firm. 
Consistent with prior research, I also include company and audit firm control variables 
that have been shown to be related to discretionary accruals (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; Reynolds 
and Francis 2000; Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Reichelt and Wang 2010). 
Specifically, I control for the amount of firm assets (SIZE), firms reporting losses (LOSS), firms 
receiving going-concern opinions (GC), firms with internal control weaknesses (ICW), cash flow 
from operations (CFO), LEVERAGE, firm inventory and accounts receivables (INVAR), firms in 
in higher litigation risk industries (LITIGATION), operating performance (ROA), firm 
complexity (MERGER, FOREIGN, and LOG(SEGMENT)), annually inspected audit firms 
(ANNUAL), and auditor TENURE.  ε is a random disturbance term. 
4.3.1 Empirical Results 
 The descriptive statistics and results from estimating model (2) are presented in Table 3. 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the sample, and Panel B reports the results of estimating 
equation (2) when the dependent variable is |DACC| (|DACCd|). Panel A reports that the mean 
|DACC| is 5 percent and the mean |DACCd| is 6 percent. All other variables are similar to 
previous literature (Becker et al. 1998; Reynolds and Francis 2000; Frankel et al. 2002; 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003). Panel B reports the coefficients of the control variables, which are 
generally consistent with prior studies (Becker et al. 1998; Reynolds and Francis 2000; Frankel 
et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003). 
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Panel B consistently report that the coefficient for the variable of interest (POST_REM) is 
negative and statistically significant for both the Kothari (|DACC|) and Dechow Dichev 
(|DACCd|) Abnormal Accrual models. This result indicates that audit quality improved 
significantly after the issuance of the Part II report (post remediation periods), which supports 
H2. That is, audit firms were more restrictive in allowing management to manage earnings after 
the issuance of their Part II report.  
It is interesting to note that in completing the task of clearing the quality control issues 
identified by the PCAOB, the audit firms may have determined that it is in their best interest to 
acquiesce to the fee pressure while exerting more effort that ultimately resulted in increased audit 
quality. In this way the firm was willing to take to reduce its margin in order to keep its clients.  
TABLE 3: The Impact of the Issuance of the  
PCAOB Part II Report on Audit Quality 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  N   Mean   Median   Std Dev    
|DACC|  4,174 0.06 0.04 0.08   
|DACCd| 3,813 0.07 0.04 0.14   
AUDIT FEES ($000) 4,174 2,349.24 1,076.86 4,337.16   
SIZE 4,174 6.51 6.48 2.09   
INVAR 4,174 0.21 0.18 0.17   
FOREIGN 4,174 0.99 1.00 0.10   
MERGER 4,174 0.17 0.00 0.37   
GC 4,174 0.04 0.00 0.19   
ICW 4,174 0.06 0.00 0.23   
LOSS 4,174 0.34 0.00 0.48   
TENURE 4,174 9.05 7.00 7.89   
ROA 4,174 0.08 0.07 0.10   
LITIGATION 4,174 0.25 0.00 0.43   
LEVERAGE 4,174 0.14 0.12 0.66   
SEGMENT 4,174 0.58 0.00 0.70   
CFO 4,174 0.05 0.08 0.29   
BIG4 4,174 0.85 1.00 0.36   
TIER 2 4,174 0.13 0.00 0.34   




TABLE 3 (continued) 




Abnormal Accruals |DACC| 
Dechow and Dichev's Abnormal 
Accruals |DACCd| 
Variables Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT          0.061             3.57  ***          0.116             3.82  *** 
SIZE         (0.006)           (9.16) ***         (0.003)           (2.41) ** 
INVAR          0.026             3.50  ***          0.036             2.65  *** 
FOREIGN          0.014             1.20             0.017             0.77    
MERGER         (0.000)           (0.11)            0.002             0.31    
GC          0.024             3.26  ***          0.053             4.07  *** 
ICW          0.013             2.53  **         (0.012)           (1.19)   
LOSS          0.012             3.90  ***         (0.007)           (1.20)   
TENURE         (0.000)           (2.47) **         (0.000)           (0.79)   
ROA          0.094             6.37  ***          0.041             1.49    
LITIGATION          0.004             1.26            (0.000)            0.00      
LEVERAGE         (0.000)           (0.02)           (0.006)           (1.74) * 
SEGMENT         (0.002)           (1.39)           (0.006)           (1.65) * 
CFO         (0.022)           (3.41) ***         (0.046)           (5.02) *** 
ANNUAL          0.014              1.16            (0.035)           (1.87) * 
POST_REM         (0.007)           (2.62) ***         (0.018)           (3.47) *** 
        N  
 
         4,174  
 
          3,813  






***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively using a two-tailed test. t-
value and p-value are computed based on the methodology in Rogers (1993) clustered by firm. The model includes 
year fixed effects which are not presented for brevity. |DACC| is the absolute value of abnormal accruals based on the 
performance-adjusted modified Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005), and |DACCd| is the absolute value of abnormal 





5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 As the Big 4 and Tier 2 audit firms audit approximately 60% of all Compustat clients 
during my sample period (99% of my sample), I consider an additional question as to the effect 
of Part II report issuances on audit fees and audit quality for the annually versus triennially 
inspected audit firms. I include the interaction of the POST_REM period with the ANNUALLY 
reviewed audit firms (POST_ANNUAL) in each of the audit fee models (1a, 1b and 1c) and 
audit quality model (2).  
 The results of the triennially versus annually inspected audit firms are presented in Table 
4 Panels A and B.  In Panel A, I provide the results for the audit fee analysis. I find that the 
annually inspected audit firms not only have a 3.6% significant decrease in audit fees after the 
issuance of their Part II report (p_value <. 010) but they also have a 5% highly significant 
decrease in their ability to increase fees (p_value < 0.05) along with a 44.1% highly significant 
negative change in audit fees (p_value < 0.01)
5
. However the triennially inspected audit firms do 
not have a significant increase in audit fees during their post remediation period (p_value < 0.10) 
and do not experience a significant change in their ability to increase fees nor do they experience 
a significant change in audit fees as compared to the annually inspected audit firms. Overall the 
results indicate that the annually inspected audit firms have the greatest reputational damage 
after the release of the Part II report. 
 In Panel B of Table 4, I provide the results for the audit quality analysis. I find that the 
annually inspected audit firms have a highly significant increase in audit quality for both the 
Kothari (2005) abnormal accrual (p_value < 0.05) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) abnormal 
accrual (p_value < 0.01) models. However, there isn’t a significant change in audit quality for 
                                                          
5
 The f-test shows the significance of the Post Remediation Period (POST_REM) plus the interaction of the Post Remediation 
Period and Annually (POST_ANNUAL) inspected firms. 
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the triennially inspected audit firms as compared to the annually inspected audit firms. Overall 
the results indicate that the annually inspected audit firms are increasing their effort to not only 
meet the expectations of the PCAOB to clear the quality control deficiencies, but also to keep 
their clients resulting in increased audit quality. 
In summary, my results suggest that clients of annually inspected audit firms who receive 
a public Part II report are able to bargain for lower audit fees while receiving higher audit 
quality. However, clients of the triennially inspected audit firms may be better served to switch 
auditors after the public release of their audit firms Part II report, as prior research indicates that 
audit fees are generally lower when clients switch auditors (DeAngelo 1981; Francis and Simon 
1987) and those clients who switch receive higher audit quality (Buslepp and Victoravich 2014).  
28 
 
TABLE 4: The Impact of the Issuance of the PCAOB Part II Reports on  
Triennially versus Annually Inspected Audit Firms 




Log Audit Fees Fee Premium Change in Audit Fees 
 Coeff   t-stat   Coeff   t-stat  Coeff Chi-Sq Coeff Chi-Sq  Coeff  t-stat  Coeff   t-stat  
INTERCEPT 2.418 17.31*** 2.272 14.28*** (0.280) 0.16 0.062  0.01 1.152  1.78* 1.061  1.32 
SIZE 0.488 81.56*** 0.488 81.59*** 0.058 6.53*** 0.058  6.53** 0.044  1.40 0.044  1.37 
LIQUIDITY (0.012) (3.56)*** (0.012) (3.57)*** 0.006 0.2179 0.006  0.22 0.447 22.29*** 0.447  22.28*** 
INVAR 0.566  7.74*** 0.577  7.88*** 0.004 0.00 (0.023)  0.01 (0.001) (4.07)*** (0.001) (4.07)*** 
FOREIGN 0.278  3.08*** 0.283  3.12*** (0.082) 0.06 (0.091)  0.07 (0.368) (0.60) (0.365) (0.66) 
MERGER 0.035  1.39 0.035  1.38 0.316 10.95*** 0.316 10.98*** (0.217) (1.41) (0.217) (1.41) 
GC 0.286  5.37*** 0.286  5.37*** (0.174) 0.75 (0.176)  0.77 (1.190) (3.20)*** (1.191) (3.20)*** 
ICW 0.328  8.34*** 0.330  8.38*** 0.271 3.14* 0.267  3.05* (0.439) (2.17)** (0.438) (2.17)** 
LOSS 0.115  4.95*** 0.115  4.97*** (0.096) 1.16 (0.097)  1.20 0.220  1.77* 0.220  1.77* 
YE (0.006) (0.26) (0.004) (0.19) (0.029) 0.12 (0.032)  0.14 7.540  8.48*** 7.540  8.48*** 
TENURE 0.007  5.33*** 0.007  5.37*** (0.001) 0.01 (0.001)  0.02       
ROA (0.045) (0.42) (0.046) (0.42) 0.288 0.50 0.289  0.51 0.000  0.20 0.000  0.20 
LITIGATION 0.090  2.58*** 0.088  2.51** 0.038 0.08 0.044  0.10       
LEVERAGE (0.014) (0.86) (0.014) (0.86) (0.022) 0.17 (0.022)  0.16 0.000  1.66* 0.000  1.66* 
SEGMENT 0.096  6.94*** 0.095  6.89*** 0.027 0.27 0.029  0.30 (0.396) (1.27) (0.397) (1.27) 
LEVEL 3  0.109  4.62*** 0.110  4.69*** (0.127) 2.01 (0.131)  2.13 (0.216) (1.19) (0.215) (1.19) 










ANNUAL 0.670  8.42*** 0.814  7.44*** (0.453) 2.30 (0.799)  3.42* 0.204  0.41 0.296  0.43 
POST_REM (0.030) (1.42) 0.251  1.69* (0.173) 4.72** (0.825)  2.10 (0.438) (3.26)*** (0.251) (0.25) 




(0.036)  2.83*  
 
(0.259)  3.91**   (0.441)  10.64***  
            N 
 
     4,263  
 





77.67 4.28  4.29      21.13   21.11 
% Concordiant 
    








TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Audit Quality Impact 
 
Kothari Abnormal Accruals |DACC| Dechow and Dichev's Abnormal Accruals |DACCd| 
Variables Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT 0.061 3.57 *** 0.077 3.66 *** 0.116 3.82 *** 0.119 3.35 *** 
SIZE (0.006) (9.16) *** (0.006) (9.18) *** (0.003) (2.41) ** (0.003) (2.41) ** 
INVAR 0.026 3.50 *** 0.025 3.43 *** 0.036 2.65 *** 0.036 2.63 *** 
FOREIGN 0.014 1.20   0.014 1.19   0.017 0.77   0.017 0.76   
MERGER (0.000) (0.11)   (0.000) (0.10)   0.002 0.31   0.002 0.31   
GC 0.024 3.26 *** 0.025 3.30 *** 0.053 4.07 *** 0.053 4.07 *** 
ICW 0.013 2.53 ** 0.013 2.48 ** (0.012) (1.19)   (0.012) (1.20)   
LOSS 0.012 3.90 *** 0.012 3.90 *** (0.007) (1.20)   (0.007) (1.21)   
TENURE (0.000) (2.47) ** (0.000) (2.48) ** (0.000) (0.79)   (0.000) (0.79)   
ROA 0.094 6.37 *** 0.093 6.33 *** 0.041 1.49   0.041 1.48   
LITIGATION 0.004 1.26   0.004 1.28   (0.000) -   0.000 -   
LEVERAGE (0.000) (0.02)   (0.000) (0.03)   (0.006) (1.74) * (0.006) (1.74) * 
SEGMENT (0.002) (1.39)   (0.002) (1.36)   (0.006) (1.65) * (0.006) (1.64) * 
CFO (0.022) (3.41) *** (0.021) (3.34) *** (0.046) (5.02) *** (0.046) (5.00) *** 
ANNUAL 0.014 1.16   (0.003) (0.17)   (0.035) (1.87) * (0.039) (1.47)   
POST_REM (0.007) (2.62) *** (0.037) (1.62)   (0.018) (3.47) *** (0.022) (0.59)   
POST_ANNUAL      0.031 1.32           0.002  0.06   
POST_REM + POST_ANNUAL   
 
(0.006) 6.14 **   
 
(0.020) 12.31 *** 
 N  
 
   4,174  
  
 4,174  
 
     3,813  
  
      3,813  








         3.70  
 This table reports the additional analysis for audit fees and audit quality. The sample includes all clients of firms who have a public Part II report. The f-test provides the 
significance of the Post Remediation Period (POST_REM) plus the interaction of the Post Remediation Period and Annually (POST_ANNUAL) inspected firms. The sample is a 
block sample with the same firms throughout the sample period. Each model includes industry (based on two-digit SIC code) and year fixed effects which are not presented for 
brevity. t-values and p-values are computed based on the methodology in Rogers (1993) and clustered by firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denotes 





Ultimately the PCAOB is charged with protecting the interests of investors and furthering 
the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports. To 
accomplish their charge the PCAOB relies on its inspection process to provide information to the 
audit firms on their ability to produce quality audits. This information is also provided to audit 
clients and investors in the release of the Part I reports and ultimately in the release of the Part II 
reports if the audit firm is unable to remediate its quality control issues in the 12 month 
remediation period. My study directly addresses the question of whether the PCAOB is meeting 
its objectives as I consider the effect of the Part II release on audit quality. I find that audit firms 
who have a public Part II report have a significant increase in audit quality after the issuance of 
their Part II report. Additionally, I find that it is the annually inspected firms who have the 
highest increase in audit quality as compared to the triennially inspected firms. My findings 
directly support the view that the PCAOB is meeting its objective of increasing audit quality 
through the inspection process (Carecello et al. 2011; Gunny et al. 2013; Busepp and Vistoravich 
2014).  
Recent research has indicated there is reputational damage for those audit firms with 
public Part II reports as these firms lose market share following the release of the report (Nagy 
2014; Busepp and Vistoravich 2014). However, this research does not address the cost associated 
with clients who choose to remain with the audit firm after the public release of their audit firms 
Part II report. In an effort to keep its clients the firm maybe more willing to charge less audit 
fees. However the firm may also need to increase their efforts at the corporate and ultimately the 
client level to completely address the issues identified in the Part II release. To recover the costs 
of the extra effort, the audit firm would have to negotiate fee increases during a time that the 
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clients are viewing them as substandard. I find that audit fees are not significantly different after 
the issuance of the Part II report; however, audit firms are unable to increase fees and the change 
in audit fees is significantly negative. Additionally, I find that the annually inspected audit firms 
not only have significantly lower audit fees, but also have significantly negative changes in audit 
fees as well as a significant negative propensity to increase fees as compared to the triennially 
inspected audit firms. Overall, my results support the view that the issuance of a Part II report 
does damage the reputation of the firm thereby creating an impetus for change. 
Overall, my results indicate that there is an associated cost to the audit firms with 
publicly disclosed Part II reports. However this cost is not associated with a decline in audit 
quality. It is interesting to note that in completing the task of clearing the quality control issues 
identified by the PCAOB the audit firms may have determined that it is in their best interest to 
acquiesce to the fee pressure while exerting more effort that ultimately resulted in increased audit 
quality.  In this way the firm was willing to take a reduction to its margin in order to keep its 
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LNAF = natural log audit fees paid by clients to auditors; 
|DACC| = the absolute value of abnormal accruals based on the performance-adjusted modified 
Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005). 
|DACCd| = the absolute value of abnormal accruals based on Dechow and Dichev (2002); 
FEE INCREASE = 1 if the percentage change in audit fees from period t-1 to t > 0, 0 otherwise; 
∆AF = audit fees (aft) in the year following the issuance of the Part II report minus the audit fees 
(aft-1) prior to the issuance of the Part II report divided by audit fees (aft-1) in the year 
prior to the issuance of the Part II report; 
 
Variable of Interest: 
POST_REM = 1 for the 24 month period following the issuance of the Part II report, 0 
otherwise; 
POST_ANNUAL = Interaction of POST-REM * ANNUAL; 
            
Control Variables: 
ABAF = Abnormal audit fees calculated based on the residual of the audit fee model (1a). 
ANNUAL = 1 if audited by an annually inspected auditor, 0 otherwise; 
CFO = operating cash flows divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; 
FOREIGN = 1 if foreign operations, as indicated by foreign currency adjustments to income, 0 
otherwise; 
GC = 1 if a firm receives a going-concern opinion, 0 otherwise; 
ICW = 1 if a firm has an internal control material weakness over financial reporting, 0 otherwise; 
INTANG = 1 if a firm has intangible assets 
INVAR = Inventory plus accounts receivables divided by total assets; 
LEVEL3 = 1 if a firm has Level 3 valued assets and/or liabilities, 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGE = long-term liabilities divided by total assets; 
LITIGATION = an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in a high-litigation industry 
(SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370–7370), 0 
otherwise; 
LIQUIDITY = Ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities; 
LOSS = 1 if net income is less than zero, 0 otherwise; 
MERGER = 1 if a firm has merger/acquisition activities, 0 otherwise; 
ROA = income before interests and taxes, divided by total assets; 
SEGMENT = natural log of the number of business segments; 
SIZE = natural log of total assets; 
TENURE = auditor tenure in number of years; and 
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